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A special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science contains 
articles on the material theory of induction, including the manuscript of the 
monograph The Material Theory of Induction. This document contains my 
responses to the articles and will be published as “Author’s Reponses” in the 
journal. 
 
To see an issue of this journal dedicated to the material theory of induction is not merely 
satisfying. It is quite thrilling. It tells me that there is considerable interest in the material 
approach to inductive inference and that there is much more to come. I offer my thanks to 
each author who contributed to this volume for their interest in the topic and for the effort 
needed to prepare their papers. My special thanks, however, are reserved for the volume’s 
editors, Wendy Parker and Elay Shech. Assembling a volume like this may seem like a 
minor chore to those who have never tried it. The reality is that the work is trying, 
exhausting and endless. They persevered and they surely must be pleased with the result. 
 In reflecting on the editors’ invitation to respond to the papers in this issue, it 
became clear that no unified response is possible. Each paper picks up a different aspect 
of The Material Theory of Induction. Each requires a separate response. A unified 
response would be reduced to generalities that fail to connect properly with any. Those 
individual responses are provided below. Many of the papers have mounted challenges to 
positions I defend. This is to be expected. My volume disputes wisdoms across the board 
that have become established with greater comfort than they deserve. The challenges in 
this issue are sometimes spirited. I have not shied away from responding with comparable 
vigor. These papers are not exercises in perfunctory adulation. They are a stress test of 
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the material theory of induction. My sense is that the theory passes the test and I explain 
why I think so in my responses. 
 
Alan Baker, “Schemas for induction” 
 One of my critiques of the formal approach to inductive inference is that all 
inductive schemas face counterexamples. The natural reaction to these counterexamples 
has been to embellish the schemas to preclude contradiction with the counterexamples. 
What results is a cycle of woe, a death spiral. Each embellished schema faces new 
counterexamples. Efforts to further embellish the schema to accommodate them attract 
new counterexamples; and so on, apparently without end. With each iteration of the 
cycle, the scope of the schema becomes smaller while the formulation of the schema 
becomes longer and more convoluted. 
 My diagnosis is that the embellishments can make momentary gains since they 
are enriching the schemas with background facts. As we add more, these facts play a 
greater role in the warrant supplied by the schema. The material theory simply takes this 
process to its endpoint. All the authorization of an inductive inference is carried out by 
background facts. 
 Alan Baker has proposed an ingenious escape from the death spiral. Do not 
succumb to the natural urge to embellish the schemas. Simply accept them for what they 
are, fallible. That is, he urges that the counterexample ridden schema provide us with a 
“defeasible license” for an inference. We should accept what they license as a default 
until we have reasons to do otherwise. Those reasons would be the sorts of 
counterexamples that I have displayed as troubling the schema. 
 This reverses my view that no schema can claim the status of a default. We have a 
positive obligation in each case to establish the appropriateness of the schema to the case 
at hand. That appropriateness is established by displaying a suitable background fact in 
the context. 
 Two things concern me about Baker’s proposal. First, adopting a schema as a 
default is only viable if the schema is mostly correct in its applications. To use Baker’s 
example, we can say that ceteris paribus lightning strikes the tallest object since that is 
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what mostly happens. However, the sorts of schemas on offer are unlike this. They 
mostly fail. Take Baker’s “EIS” schema: 
All observed F’s have been G. 
Therefore, the next observed F will be G. 
If we are truly free to insert anything into the slots of F and G, then this schema will 
almost always deliver a false result.  
 This failure might not be apparent from Baker’s narrative. He gives as an instance 
the familiar: 
All observed emeralds have been green. 
Therefore, the next observed emerald will be green. 
This example is exceptional. The F’s and G’s have been chosen very carefully, under the 
guidance of background facts, so as to ensure that the inference works. This appears 
natural since no details are given of the observations. If we had a fuller account of just 
what the observations were, we would find a vast array of F’s and G’s for which the 
inference would fail. 
 For this reason I prefer the example I give in Chapter 1 of The Material Theory of 
Induction. Curie observed that a tiny sample of radium chloride in her laboratory is 
crystallographically like barium chloride. She infered all are so. This one fact could be 
redescribed in very many ways, using very many different “F’s” and “G’s.” Is the 
observation of a tiny thing in her laboratory that has spiky crystals; or a crystal that is at 
temperature 20C; or a crystal in Paris; or a crystal prepared by Curie? I go to some 
lengths to indicate just how careful Curie had to be in picking her predicate G. The 
inference would fail for almost every other possible candidate other than the carefully 
chosen “crystallographically like barium chloride.” 
 My second concern with Baker’s proposal is that he gives us no good reason to 
accept any inductive schema as a default. In many cases of deductive inference schemas, 
those reasons are provided by the meaning of the terms. Take: 
All F’s are G. 
Therefore, some F’s are G. 
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That this schema generates valid inferences follows from the meaning of “all” and 
“some.” Nothing more is needed. However what basis do we have for taking the 
inductive version of this schema as a default? 
Some F’s are G. 
Therefore, all F’s are G. 
The inferences this schema authorizes amplify the factual content of the premises. Why 
should we expect this amplification to succeed? Are we to assume that once an F has 
appeared with a G, the world is such that it will generally continue to do so? If we can 
substitute anything for F and for G, it is surely not the case. I argued in Chapter 2 of the 
The Material Theory of Induction that this amplification succeeds only when we 
implement the schema in an environment hospitable to the amplification for these 
specific F and G. That the environment is hospitable, I argued further, is a factual matter 
that may be true or false. That it is true, when it is, provides the material warrant for the 
inference. 
 These two concerns taken together lead me to prefer my material diagnosis of the 
prevalence of counterexamples to formal schemas of inductive inference.  
 
Paul Bartha’s, “Norton’s material theory of analogy” 
 Paul Bartha has written a careful and thorough appraisal of the material analysis 
of analogical inference. I agree with almost everything he says. He disavows a fully 
formal account of analogical inference and suggests that we seek one that has both formal 
and material elements. Such an account seems quite possible to me. Analogical 
inferences often share formal similarities that allow them to be grouped together. This 
fact has encouraged efforts to find formal accounts of analogical inference. Such an 
intermediate account could be quite useful in practical investigations in the ways that 
Bartha has outlined. Bartha also correctly points out that scientists, engaged in analogical 
reasoning, might not always start with a fact of analogy. That source and target system 
are governed by some particular fact of analogy may only become explicit at the end of 
the analysis. 
 Much of this, however, goes beyond what I seek to establish in the analysis of 
analogical inference. I do not seek to reconstruct the procedures used by scientists in their 
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efforts to discover good analogical inferences. That project is one of far greater ambitions 
than mine.  While I hope that the material perspective will be useful practically to those 
seeking analogical inferences, an account of that practice requires much more extensive 
analysis such as Bartha has given in his writings. 
 My concern is limited to justification or warrant. What makes some particular 
analogical inference a good one? My answer is that the chain of justification terminates 
materially, in a fact of analogy. The inference is only good in so far as that fact is a truth. 
The justificatory chain may pass through intermediate formal schemas of limited scope. 
But those schemas, as applied to the case at hand, will in turn be justified by the pertinent 
fact of analogy. 
 With these limited ambitions recalled, I can now explain why Bartha’s specific 
criticism is untroubling. His first and main objection is that, he says, the material account 
has limited scope. He lists (Section 5.1) three scenarios in which he asserts that the 
material account fails. They are: 
(a) No clear fact of analogy. 
(b) No independent support for the fact of analogy. 
(c) The fact of analogy is too vague to support any inference. 
The concern in (a) is that “There may be no specific identification of any fact of 
analogy.” If there is no warranting fact of analogy, then the candidate analogical 
inference is an inductive fallacy. That is the end of it. If there is a suitable fact of analogy, 
there is no need for the scientist to identify it. The analogical inference is warranted, even 
if the scientist may not be able to articulate the warrant or even know it. This 
phenomenon is familiar in deductive scenarios. Many scientists are not schooled in 
deductive logic and cannot name many or even any deductive schema. Yet they are 
competent in deductive inference. Matters can be more abstruse. How many physicists 
know that they are relying on the axiom of choice when they attribute a basis to some 
large vector space? Or that they are presuming the axiom of countable additivity when 
they sum infinitely many probabilities? Imperialist Bayesians will insist that all the 
scientists’ evidential reasoning is justified, unbeknown to them, by the axioms of the 
probability calculus. 
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 The concern with (b) is “Even if a fact of analogy is identified, there may be no 
independent inductive argument offered in support, and there may be none available.” 
The fact of analogy must be a truth if the analogical inference is to be warranted. If it is 
not so, then the candidate analogical inference is an inductive fallacy. Bartha provides a 
good example. The discrete lines in the emission spectrum of hydrogen were puzzling. In 
1871, Stoney (1871, p. 296) suggested that the discrete frequencies arose from oscillatory 
molecular motions analogous to the specific harmonics produced by a violin string. The 
fact of analogy presumed is not true. The discreteness of the lines is quantum mechanical 
in origin. They are associated with the quantum jumps of Bohr’s 1913 theory of the atom 
and the mode of their production was eventually recovered from quantum 
electrodynamics.  Hence, I do agree with Bartha’s conclusion: “So, on Norton’s account, 
there is no warrant for the analogical inference.” That is just as it should be. 
 Finally, matters are the same with concern (c). If the fact of analogy is too vague 
to support the inference, then it is not warranted. Once again, that is just as it should be. 
 Bartha’s main criticism derived from his misunderstanding of the material theory 
as an account of the procedures scientists use in arriving at analogical inferences. His 
second criticism asserts a limitation on the range of analogical inferences that the 
material account can judge to be warranted. As far as I can see, it amounts to this 
(Section 5.2): “the analysis simply doesn’t work if the fact of analogy is not patent, not 
independently justifiable, or does not function as an intermediate step in the argument.” I 
find the analysis to work well in all these cases. The fact of analogy can serve as a 
warrant even if it is not patent or explicitly present in the argumentation offered by the 
scientist. If the fact of analogy is not justifiable, then the candidate analogical inference is 
an inductive fallacy. There is no other way to warrant it. For reasons already given in my 
chapter, it is hopeless to seek a warrant in some formal schema or even in what Bartha 
calls a “quasi-formal” theory. 
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Pat Corvini, “What induction is (and what it should not be): a concepts-
centric perspective on Norton's radium chloride example” 
 Pat Corvini has taken rather sharp exception to my treatment of Curie’s inductive 
inference in Chapter 1 of the Material Theory of Induction. The basis of our disagreement 
lies in our different conceptions of the nature of inductive inference.  
 For Corvini, what makes an inference inductive, at least in these cases, is that it 
infers from particulars to a generality. What is essential to the cogency of the inference is 
the use of appropriate concepts. Inductive risk may be present to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, it is a nuisance distraction. She writes: “I thus believe that focusing on 
‘risk’ as an essential marker of ‘induction’—as Norton's analysis of this example would 
have us do—is a mistake.” 
 For me, as Chapter 1 makes clear, inductive inferences are defined as those that 
arrive at conclusions deductively stronger than their premises. Inductive risk is not an 
incidental feature. It is constitutive of inductive inference. This broad conception is called 
for by the wide range of inferences and inferential practices covered in the sixteen 
chapters of the book. 
 What may be lost in this emphasis on our differences is that Corvini and I largely 
agree on the example. Much of my chapter is devoted to making just this point. Inductive 
generalizations like Curie's can only work when we have found what are, in later 
terminology, the “projectible” properties. I went to some pains to stress how difficult it 
was to find the appropriate projectible properties in crystallography and to criticize 
approaches that neglected this difficulty. 
 How can this episode in crystallography be used by each of us to illustrate our 
views on inductive inference? For Corvini, the key is the formation of the appropriate 
concepts. It is a daunting task to give a proper account of the establishment of these 
concepts. By Curie’s time, that was the work of over a century and well beyond the scope 
of an introductory illustration in an introductory chapter. Instead I chose a simple 
inductive inference that came after the hard work of establishing these projectible 
properties was over. Curie and the other radiochemists of the early twentieth century 
found that samples of radium chloride have particular crystallographic properties. They 
then infer inductively that all do. 
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 The inference is a small step in the larger crystallographic project. That is what 
makes it tractable in an introductory illustration. It means that we can have full control of 
the inductive risk taken. The example illustrates the key idea of the material theory of 
induction: how background facts warrant an inductive inference. 
 While this example serves my purposes, it does not serve to illustrate Corvini’s 
approach to induction, since it comes after all the hard conceptual work has been 
completed. So I understand her discomfort with my choice of the example. While it 
illustrates my point, it does not illustrate hers. Unfortunately, Corvini has presented my 
choice of example in rather dark tones. She calls my treatment of the example not merely 
mistaken, but, repeatedly, one that “misrepresents” the ampliation. The term has 
connotations of dishonesty and deception, and, in the legal context, fraud. Similarly, my 
historiography is dubious, harboring “historical inaccuracies” and “a frustratingly 
complicated tangle of fiction and fact.” 
 These are serious accusations and I took them seriously. However, after 
considering her many objections, I do not find that any of them substantially alter my 
analysis or the conclusions I have drawn. They do call for one minor amendment.   
 To recapitulate, Curie and other radiochemists at the start of the 20th century had 
prepared only few samples of radium chloride. They noted the uniformity in the 
crystalline forms and described them using the vocabulary of mineralogy of the time. In 
reporting their observations, they made a generalization. I reported the generalization as 
an unqualified “All samples....” After Corvini's critique, I can see that they likely limited 
the scope of the “all” tacitly. I would change the generalization to “All samples prepared 
under comparable conditions...” This is a generalization from the few actual cases at hand 
to all cases, now restricted by a “comparable conditions” clause. 
 My basic point remains. In making the generalization, the radiochemists exposed 
themselves to inductive risk. Given the accepted mineralogy of the time, if radium 
chloride was to form crystals at all, they would have to be in one of the identified 
crystallographic families. Under it, the only thing that can go wrong in the generalization 
is that the crystals do not form in the monoclinic family in which barium chloride also 
crystallizes. That is the inductive risk of polymorphism that I identify. 
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 It is a real risk. The tacit restriction to “comparable conditions” is a vague gesture 
at something of great complexity. We must answer many questions to specify it. What is 
the temperature of the solution in which the crystals form? What is the rate of 
evaporation? What is the composition and texture of the walls of the containing vessel? 
What is the mode of heating? Is it uniform or localized? What are the possible 
impurities? Are there crystallographically anomalous seed crystals already present? In 
coming to their general conclusion, Curie and the other radiochemists of the time were 
taking the risk that changes in one or more of these conditions might produce different 
results. It seems fair to say that the risk is small, but it is there. 
 The basic moral I draw from the illustration remains. The inductive inference 
Curie and the other radiochemists of her time made was warranted not by a formal 
schema, but by a background fact. I have called it the “weakened Häuy's principle” and 
Corvini may want to dispute the name since Häuy himself worked nearly a century before 
Curie. 1 However its content does summarize the background facts Curie needed to 
warrant the generalization. 
 
Kevin Davey, “Inference to the best explanation and Norton’s Material 
Theory of Induction.” 
 The goal of Kevin Davey’s paper is to offer a friendly amendment to the material 
theory of induction. The context dependence of inductive inference is to be retained, but 
the locality of rules of inductive inference is to be replaced by a universally applicable 
schema of inference to the best explanation (“IBE”). 
  A major part of Davey’s text criticizes a reconstruction of IBE arguments 
in Chapters 8 and 9 of The Material Theory of Induction. I agree with the criticism. To 
explain why, we need to recall the structure of the main argument in those chapters. The 
 
1 Tutton (1910, p. 4) attributes to Häuy a “great truth” that he calls a “principle” and is 
given by him in italics: “to every specific substance of definite chemical composition 
capable of existing in the solid condition there appertains a crystalline form peculiar to 
and characteristic of that substance.” 
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schema of IBE depends on the idea that hypotheses do not accrue support merely by 
accommodating evidence. They have to explain it. There is, we are to suppose, some 
especially potent inductive power in explanation, not present in mere accommodation. 
When I began working on IBE, I was unable to identify that extra power, intrinsic to 
explanation, or even to come to a clear idea of the notion of explanation at issue. Since a 
large repertoire of instances of IBE in science is available, I decided to proceed 
inductively. I collected many of these instances and tried to discern how they worked. 
The results are reported in Chapters 8 and 9. I identified a common structure in which 
there was no distinctive notion of explanation. Crucially this commonality persists only at 
a broad and superficial level. An appraisal of the inductive strength of each instance 
requires examination of the details of each and the particular background facts warranting 
them.  
 The common structure consists of two steps, detailed in the chapters and Davey’s 
text. The second step is that the better of competing hypotheses is to be taken as the best, 
absolutely, and inferred. This Davey calls the “better-is-best principle.” Davey raises 
significant objections to the principle. He asks, in good material fashion, what material 
facts could justify it. He finds none adequate. He asks: “Why does Norton think that his 
better-is-best principle is justified?” 
 There is an easy answer to this question: I do not think it is justified. I agree with 
Davey’s criticism. Indeed, I do not think that I even identified a principle. All my 
narrative gave was a summary of the commonalities among standard IBE’s in science. 
The mere fact of carrying this superficial similarity is not enough to warrant an inference. 
Materially understood, each instance identified has to be warranted by suitable 
background facts. In this case by case analysis, the second step, I expected, would prove 
to be the greatest weakness of the arguments reconstructed. My summary judgment, 
quoted only partially in Davey’s text, (Ch.8, §1) was: 
The second step is more fraught. We are to suppose that better is best; and 
that best is good enough to warrant commitment. Preference becomes 
commitment. The step is commonly grounded in a presumption that no other 
theory can do better than those explicitly considered. That presumption is so 
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hard to justify that this second step is often left tacit and sometimes even 
omitted completely. For the step commonly relies merely on our human 
imaginative powers to sustain the conclusion that there is no better account 
just beyond our horizon. Kyle Stanford [reference] has effectively and 
powerfully described this problem of “unconceived alternatives.” 
Then, in Chapter 9 (§3), where I summarize the instances in a table, the column 
summarizing that step has entries like “tacit,” “not taken” and “complicated.” 
 These are not ringing endorsements of Davey’s principle. They convey my 
repeated concern about the weakness of this step in each case. However, I forgo a 
definite, blanket statement against the step since the material theory of induction enjoins 
me to treat each case on its individual merits. 
 The pertinent conclusions of the two chapters are that (i) the standard examples of 
IBE in science do not employ any distinctive notion of explanation with peculiar 
inductive powers; and (ii) these standard examples share a common weakness in so far as 
they try to carry out a better-to-best inference. As a result, I find it hard to share Davey’s 
enthusiasm for IBE. The enduring and apparently irremediable difficulty is that the 
notion of explanation employed remains obscure, as does the origin of its inductive 
powers. The case for this difficulty is developed at length in Chapter 8, so I do not need 
to rehearse it again here. 
 Davey dismisses this concern that, as he puts it, “IBE is so vaguely defined as to 
lack real substantive content.” He continues that it is “unfair, as at least nowadays there 
are many reasonably precise formulations of IBE.” This appraisal is supported by three 
citations. None, however, give a precise account of explanation, adequate to sustaining 
IBE. One (Douven [2018] in Davey’s references) writes: 
IBE is best thought of as a slogan that can be fleshed out in different ways, 
where different fleshings-out may have different merits and drawbacks, 
depending on the context of usage … it is difficult to find a statement of IBE 
that is more specific than the slogan-like characterization… 
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Instead of providing some reasonably precise universal formulation, this appraisal 
aligns better with the contextuality of the material analysis. The other two 
citations are to Bayesian analyses of explanation. Bayesian analyses face many 
difficulties. One is already sufficient to rule them out for present purposes. 
Bayesian analyses cannot have universal application since only a subset of 
relations of inductive support or of credences are probabilistic. Chapters 9 – 16 of 
the Material Theory of Induction are devoted to demonstrating this limitation. 
Curiously, Davey agrees with my hesitation over Bayesian analyses. His footnote 
reads “… I actually do not think that developing IBE within the context of a 
probabilistic framework is the right approach. The problem is that IBE seems to 
be applicable in cases in which probabilistic machinery is not.” 
 Davey seeks to excuse what seems to be a fatal imprecision by suggesting that we 
are asking too much. “Norton does not tell us anything positive about what the ‘licensing’ 
relation is …,” he writes. Here I see no lacuna. Material facts license inferences simply 
through the meaning of the propositions that express them. No lofty and general 
philosopher’s account is needed. It is the same with deductive logics. The proposition “If 
A then B.” authorizes us to infer from A to B simply in virtue of the meaning of “if… 
then…” Correspondingly the material fact from Chapter 1, “Generally, each crystalline 
substance has a single characteristic crystallographic form.” warrants fallible 
generalizations concerning the properties of samples of crystalline substances in virtue of 
the meaning of the proposition. If, however, there is an imprecision here, then IBE faces 
compounded imprecisions: first, in the notion of explanation itself; and then in 
accounting for how explanation licenses inferences.  
 Overall, far from providing a universally applicable inductive schema, my 
concern is whether IBE can, even in individual cases, go beyond assertions about 
explanation in vague, general terms and give us a serviceable, local schema. 
 Finally, a misunderstanding in Davey’s text needs to be corrected. It labors over 
the problem of whether the material theory of induction is (or assumes) an internalist or 
an externalist epistemology; and settles on an externalist epistemology. The correct 
answer is “neither.” The distinction between internalist and externalist epistemologies 
applies to accounts of the mode of justification of beliefs held by some agent. The 
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material theory of induction concerns relations of inductive support among propositions, 
independently of whether these propositions are held as beliefs by some agent. Here the 
theory proceeds as would an ordinary logic textbook. There modus ponens is a valid form 
and affirming the consequence is not, independently of whether the propositions they 
relate are held as beliefs. Perhaps assertions of this independence in Chapter 1 of the 
Material Theory of Induction have been misread as endorsements of an externalist 
epistemology in which the justification of an agent’s beliefs are inaccessible to the agent? 
Of course, some agent may use inductive inferences supplied by the material theory of 
induction to justify belief in some proposition from beliefs in others.  The details of the 
resulting system of justifications, however, are left by the material theory to 
epistemologies of beliefs. 
 
Job de Grefte, “Epistemic benefits of the material theory of induction”  
 According to the problem of induction, attempts to justify a rule of inductive 
inference are either circular or trigger an infinite regress. The material theory of 
induction, I maintain, dissolves the problem, since it has no universal rules of inference in 
need of justification. Attempts to set up an analogous regress problem in the justification 
of material facts fail, since they neglect the non-hierarchical structure of relations of 
inductive support. It was encouraging to see that Job de Grefte accepts this dissolution in 
his paper. Yet, he is unimpressed. He argues that the problem of induction has already 
been solved in externalist epistemologies and that the material theory of induction offers 
no epistemic advantages over the externalist solution. 
 The primary goal of the material theory was to determine which are the good 
inductive inferences and what makes them so. The material dissolution of the problem of 
induction was an unexpected, secondary benefit. Nonetheless, de Grefte’s appraisal 
underestimates the value of the dissolution. His analysis rests, as far as I can see, on three 
claims: 
1. The problem of induction is most fundamentally a problem in the epistemology 
of belief, where its solution is to be sought. 
2. Externalist epistemologies have solved the problem in that context. 
3. A material theory of induction requires an externalist epistemology. 
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Here I will explain why I doubt each of these claims. 
 First, we need a terminological clarification: De Grefte is concerned that my use 
of the term “inference” is ambiguous, when it is not. In his epistemological literature, 
“inference” refers to the passage from one belief to another and “implication” refers to 
logical relations among propositions. As I explain in the introduction to Chapter 1 of The 
Material Theory of Induction, my use of “inference” as a purely logical relation among 
propositions follows standard logic texts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here I 
will continue to resist his annexation of the term and will continue to use “inference” in 
this long-established logical sense. This maintains a continuity of terminology with the 
logical tradition in which I work. To shift its meaning, as de Grefte and others in the 
epistemology of belief seek, is to invite confusion. Someone in one tradition can then 
readily misunderstand the claims of someone in the other. Might just such a confusion be 
the origin of de Grefte’s complaints about my treatment of the problem of induction? 
 On 1.: The version of the problem of induction addressed by the material theory 
resides fully within the study of inductive logic and concerns its rules of inference. The 
rule of enumerative induction, the problem tells us, cannot be justified by noting that the 
rule has always succeeded in the past, for that is circular. This version of the problem and 
the relations explored by inductive logic are independent of our beliefs; and that is an 
important fact. Whether the fossil record provides strong inductive support for the theory 
of evolution is independent of our thoughts and beliefs. Hence the analysis of this version 
of the problem should proceed independently of our beliefs; and that is just what the 
material dissolution does. 
 De Grefte’s proposal is that the material dissolution is superfluous since an 
analogous version of the problem has been solved by externalists in the epistemology of 
belief. His claim is quite unambiguous and depends, as far as I can see, on a simple 
equivocation. In a section entitled “4. The problem of induction is an epistemological 
problem,” he writes: 
My aim is to problematise Norton’s dissolution of the problem of induction. In this 
section, I will argue that this is an epistemological problem. As we saw in the 
previous section, the material theory is best understood as a theory of logic. That 
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means that in order to bring the material theory to bear on the problem of induction, 
we have to specify first how a theory of logic can have epistemological implications  
What follows is the suggestion that the material dissolution is superfluous since 
externalists have already solved the epistemological problem. 
 Of course, I agree that that we need to see how the material theory of induction 
bears on beliefs if it is to help us solve a problem concerning beliefs. What I do not agree 
with is the equivocation when de Grefte’s shifts the meaning of the term “problem of 
induction” in the phrase “Norton’s dissolution of the problem of induction.” The target of 
my dissolution is the logical problem of induction. De Grefte’s treats my dissolution as 
an attempt to solve a different problem in epistemology and is then dissatisfied with the 
result. 
 The only defense I can see is if de Grefte has somehow come to believe that the 
logical problem derives from an analogous epistemological problem that bears the same 
name. Then solving the epistemological problem might well be needed to solve the 
logical problem. In an earlier draft, on the basis of some remarks in de Grefte’s text, I 
wrote that de Grefte had argued that logical relations among propositions derive from our 
beliefs about them. In correspondence on the draft, he assured me that he does not hold 
this indefensible belief. This leaves me unable to see what basis de Grefte has for 
“problematising,” as he put it, my logical dissolution of a problem in inductive logic. 
Indeed, I am unable to square it with his later remark “As always, we must be careful not 
to confuse logic and epistemology.” 
 On 2.: Since externalism in the epistemology of belief is not a view I know well, 
my comment is brief. To know that our beliefs are justified in a reliabilist externalism 
requires that we know that our processes of belief formation are reliable. We cannot 
know that they will continue to be reliable on the evidence of their reliability in the past. 
Otherwise we commit precisely the circular reasoning of the problem of induction. That 
they might be reliable, without us being able to show it, is irrelevant. We have no 
assurance of it. In this regard, externalists are no better off than those internalists who 
proceed only with the hope that future applications of their methods are truth conducive 
but cannot justify it.  
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 On 3.: The material theory of induction has no special connection to either 
internalist or externalist epistemologies. It is a resource that both can use. As de Grefte 
notes, it is comforting to externalists that someone can carry out a good inductive 
inference without knowing the warranting fact, which is external in that sense. However, 
internalists can respond that the warranting fact is accessible and that the activity of 
identifying such facts is routine. Much of the chapters of The Material Theory of 
Induction are devoted to this activity. 
 De Grefte argues that internalists can accommodate a formal account of inductive 
inference, but not a material account. The difference, he argues, is that a formal theory 
concerns the forms of propositions and those forms are available in mental content. 
However, the forms of the propositions are not enough to establish the validity of the 
argument. The forms can fit with many schemas, some licit, some not. To be assured of 
validity, internalists also need to know which schemas are licit. For example, from the 
premise that, for any prime, we can always find a greater one,2 Euclid infers that there is 
an infinity of primes. When we accept that inference, we accept that some version of the 
deductive schema of mathematical induction is licit, even though strict intuitionists do 
not allow it. That requires further knowledge, just as the material theory requires us to 
learn further facts to be assured that some inductive inference is good.  
 
John Earman, “Quantum sidelights on the material theory of induction” 
 It is our good fortune that this collection has been able to include Professor 
Earman’s reactions to the material theory of induction. He is a scholar for whom I have 
great admiration and from whom I have learned very much, even while being his 
colleague and occasional co-author. There is much to learn from his article and nothing in 
it to dispute. He is quite right that there are many other cases of indeterminism arising in 
our physical theories. He can write this with some authority. His 1986 Primer on 
Determinism has defined the modern study of determinism in physics. 
 
2 If p is prime, then p!+1 is either a greater prime or, if not, divisible by another prime 
greater than p. 
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 Professor Earman’s analysis concludes with a mild rebuke: “. . . The Material 
Theory of Induction undervalues the Bayesian account of inductive inference.” The 
remark is underwritten by a detailed study of how Bayesian ideas can be adapted to 
quantum theory. It is a fair rebuke, for the volume is heavily laden with complaints about 
Bayesian analysis. 
 Here I should emphasize that I fully realize and respect the immense utility of 
probabilistic analysis in many contexts. Modern statistical analysis without it would be 
unthinkable. That utility is not my target. Rather my target is the idea that Bayesianism 
provides the universally applicable account of relations of inductive support. This idea 
has become a tacit default for many who work in the philosophy of science. It encourages  
them to offer Bayesian analyses of many topics in philosophy of science. 
 To counter this presumption that Bayesian analysis is a universally applicable 
default, the volume goes to some pains to identify circumstances in which Bayesian 
analysis is not appropriate. It also seeks more general arguments against that universality. 
It is inevitable that the overall impression is one of great negativity. That negativity must 
be understood as directed narrowly at the claim of universality. I have no doubt that 
probabilistic analysis can be of great value in the right contexts; and that there are many 
of these contexts. 
 I urge a reversal of approaches. In each context, we cannot presume that Bayesian 
analysis is the automatic default. Rather, in each case, we have an obligation to display 
positively why Bayesian analysis is warranted. We should seek that warrant in the facts 
prevailing in the context. Such is the case in Professor Earman’s example. The 
probabilities derive from the basic facts of quantum theory. In other cases, however, the 
background facts will not warrant probabilities. We commit inductive fallacies if we 
nonetheless persist in their use. A striking example is the “inductive disjunctive fallacy” 
described in Norton (2008, p. 509). 
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Benjamin Genta, “How to think about analogical inferences: a reply to 
Norton” 
 Benjamin Genta’s contribution to this volume addresses the application of the 
material theory of induction to analogical inference. It contains a catalog of what he 
labels “worries” and a positive proposal to guide further research. 
 While I can offer no guarantee that my analysis of analogical inference is without 
flaws, I was relieved to find that Genta’s worries have not revealed any. Since his catalog 
is rather long, I cannot address them all. Rather I will address the three categories of 
worries listed in the three subsections of his Section 5. 
 The first worry in Section 5.1, “Ambiguous Facts of Analogy,” is that the material 
approach does not define precisely what a fact of analogy is. The material theory does as 
much as can be done in characterizing them as asserting some similarity between the 
source and target system. That description is as precise as has been routine in the 
literature and has been sufficient to support a history of analogical inference extending 
over millennia. The more serious worry is that one inductive inference might be 
warranted by multiple different facts of analogy. There are, he believes, an infinity of 
possibilities. Yet, he asserts, the material theory of induction gives us no means to discern 
which is the right one. This is not so. According to the material theory of induction, the 
warranting fact must be a fact, that is a truth, else the inference warranted is an inductive 
fallacy. Thus the infinitely many candidates likely contain infinitely many falsehoods. 
The material theory gives ample means to discern the right one. For determining which of 
many candidate propositions are factual is a task for inductive inference through further 
evidential exploration. 
 The worry in Section 5.2 “the Material Theory and Normativity,” is that the 
material theory gives us no guidance in choosing good facts of analogy and, further, 
“does not allow us to differentiate between good and bad.” The material theory gives 
scientists good advice on how to proceed: seek truths. The good warranting facts will be 
true; and the bad ones will be false. The guiding principle is that the more you know, the 
more you can infer. So if you are interested in analogical inferences connecting two 
domains, the material theory recommends learning as much factually about the 
similarities between the two domains as possible. Seek the governing fact of analogy in 
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what is learned about those similarities. Those efforts will be rewarded better than efforts 
devoted to pondering the general formal structure of similarity and dissimilarity. 
 Section 5.3 “A Possible Counterexample,” offers a case of an analogical inference 
that, purportedly, is not warranted by a fact of analogy. The analogy is between a general 
laying siege to a city and a doctor treating cancer tumors with radiation. The difficulty 
with the example is that it is a very weak analogical inference and should be judged so by 
any account, material or formal. The formal theory will judge the disanalogies stronger 
than the analogies and discount it. A material analysis will find only a thin fact of 
analogy that merely notes that the two cases are superficially alike: an agent that can be 
divided (radiation, armies) acts on its object (tumor, city). This fact warrants little. The 
analogy could be strengthened if we imagine that the general wants to minimize civilian 
casualties; and the doctor wants to minimize harm to non-cancerous tissue. Then the 
critical fact of analogy would be that the collateral damage of the agent grows faster in 
magnitude than the magnitude of the agent. If that turns out to be the case, the collateral 
damage is minimized if the agents act in divided portions. In sum, the example is not so 
much a counterexample as a bad example. 
 Genta’s paper concludes with a positive proposal for a “Guiding Principle of 
Analogical Inference.” The hope expressed in the conclusion of the paper is that this 
principle will help convince us that “future studies of analogical inference will benefit 
from additional formality…” I take a dimmer view of this urge to formalism. The 
principle falls far short of what a formal analysis should provide. It depends essentially 
on a formally unexplicated notion of similarity both within each of the source and target 
and between them; and a formally unexplicated notion of the weights assigned to them. 
 According to the material theory of induction, there are no universally applicable 
schemas for inductive inference. The familiar schemas, such an analogy or enumerative 
induction, are only possible because there is a loose similarity among the inferences they 
group together. The similarity is only superficial since the instances grouped together will 
vary in important details as we move from domain to domain. As a result, the schemas 
work near enough, but no better. The prediction of the material theory, then, is that 
efforts to adapt the schema more precisely to the range of instances will result in an 
ongoing explosion of extra clauses and conditions, each tailored to accommodate some 
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anomalous instance. A major theme of the chapter on analogy in The Material Theory of 
Induction is to display this explosive expansion by tracing the development of formal 
accounts of analogical inference. 
 Genta’s positive proposal takes us back to the beginning of this process. It is now 
only a loose fit with real cases of analogical inferences. The prediction of the material 
theory remains. Efforts to tighten that fit will not illuminate the value of tighter formal 
analysis, but will show it to be ill-advised. For it will trigger the same unproductive 
explosion of clauses and conditions avoided by a material analysis. 
 
Jonathan Livengood and Daniel Z. Korman, “Debunking material 
induction” 
 Jonathan Livengood and Daniel Z. Korman’s contribution describes what they 
call the “explanatory problem of induction.” It is a variant of the familiar problem of 
induction. According to this familiar problem, no rule of inductive inference can be 
justified. For all such justifications are either circular, when a rule is used to justify itself, 
or trigger a fanciful infinite regress of rules justified by other rules; and so on 
indefinitely. The variant problem proceeds from the most welcome assumption that an 
answer has been found through the material theory of induction to the familiar problem of 
induction: inductive inferences can be justified. We may have a conclusion about future 
occurrences well supported by justified inductive inferences. Nonetheless, the 
explanatory problem asserts, we lose our justification for believing the conclusion, if we 
come to believe that there is no suitable explanatory relationship between the conclusion 
and the facts it asserts. They then argue that no such explanatory relationship is provided 
by the material theory of induction, and, I presume, also not by any another account. 
 Livengood and Korman surmise my response correctly in their conclusion. There 
is only so much within the purview of the material theory of induction; and this problem 
lies outside of it. However, it is at the border of the concerns of the material theory, so 
here I will delineate that border. First, the principal goal of the material theory of 
induction is to determine which are the relations of inductive support among 
propositions, where those relations are independent of human concerns and beliefs. The 
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material analysis escapes the traditional Humean problem of induction simply because it 
has no unfounded rules of inductive inference. They are all replaced by local facts or 
founded by local facts. However, many have suggested that an analogous regress problem 
resides in the circumstance that these warranting facts are in turn warranted by further 
facts and those in turn by still further facts. Livengood and Korman recount and accept 
the material theory’s response, drawn from Norton (2014). There is no need for me to 
repeat it here. 
 So far, beliefs have not entered the material analysis. They enter through the 
historical case studies of The Material Theory of Induction. There, the inductive 
inferences of figures in the history of science are matched with the inductive inferences 
authorized by the material theory by, in part, reporting the beliefs of the figures. Further, 
the material theory is intended to be a guide to what we should belief. The theory gives 
no account of how we are to proceed from objective logical relations among propositions 
to justified beliefs. Rather it proceeded tacitly with what I take to be a near universal 
principle of rationality. Here is one version: 
If we are justified in believing some propositions and those propositions 
provide strong inductive support for a conclusion, then we are justified in 
believing that conclusion. 
This principle and its deductive variant are tacitly supposed almost everywhere. Without 
it I do not see how we can sustain the standard practice of teaching elementary logic in 
colleges and universities. For without the principle, these logics cease to be of practical 
use. 
 The principle seems to be a truism. To be rational simply is to conform our beliefs 
to reason, where reason is here just a synonym for logic. Yet now Livengood and 
Korman bring to light deep concerns amongst epistemologists that explanatory 
considerations can undermine the principle. While a conclusion may conform with the 
logic, we may lose our justification to believe it if we come to believe that the appropriate 
explanatory relation to the fact concluded is absent. According to the explanatory 
problem of induction, there cannot be such an explanatory relation to future facts. It 
follows that all our rational justifications concerning future facts are fragile. Mere 
reflection on this impossibility is sufficient to defeat them.  All I can do is urge these 
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epistemologists to hurry up and solve the problem lest all our logical theories become 
useless as practical instruments for forming beliefs about future facts.  
 Perhaps there is a simple solution. While this is not a literature I know, none of 
the arguments offered in Livengood and Korman’s paper seems to me sufficient to 
sustain this defeasibility of the principle of rationality or even to make clear precisely the 
explanatory relationship sought. So perhaps the principle of rationality is adequate as it 
stands. 
 
John McCaskey, “Reviving material theories of induction” 
 John McCaskey’s proposal that there is an extensive, overlooked, prior history to 
the material theory of induction is most welcome. I have a weakness for history and 
delight in the discovery that our latest enthusiasm is not novel. However, a closer reading 
of the paper shows that the overlooked tradition in inductive thought is not an earlier 
version of the material theory of induction, but a distinct tradition that is worthy of 
attention in its own right. 
 To see the difference, here are the salient features of the material theory of 
induction as I have formulated it: 
(a) Inductive inference resides in relations among propositions. We infer 
inductively from this proposition to that; or we display relations of inductive 
support among propositions. 
(b) The warrant for an inductive inference is provided by background facts. 
(c) (My special version) All warranting facts are local. 
McCaskey has identified an enduring tradition of ampliation in which the essential 
element is the formation of appropriate concepts. Once they are secured, ampliation – the 
progression from some to all – is automatic. In more modern language, the key step is 
identifying the projectable properties. The paper gives more details, so all that is needed 
here is for me to indicate how the tradition contradicts each of the features (a), (b) and (c) 
above of the material theory of induction. 
 On (a), the account does not locate ampliation at the propositional level, but at a 
prior level. We read (p.18, draft ms): 
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I propose that we will never find such a schema for inductive inference, 
simply because generalization does not enter human thought at the 
propositional level, not at the level of sentences, judgments, and inferences. 
It enters at the conceptual level, at the level of words and their meanings. 
On (b), what replaces my background facts (propositions) is something prior to 
proposition formation. It is finding good definitions. This is illustrated in the recounting 
of Bacon’s contributions to the tradition (p. 13, draft ms): 
[Bacon] showed how, using good classification logic, well-defined concepts 
could lead directly to reliable, exceptionless, necessarily true, universal 
statements. 
This is the outcome of the application of Bacon’s methods (p. 16, draft ms): 
Exceptionless universal statements are then possible. Ampliation occurs at 
the conceptual rather than the propositional level, and classification powers 
generalizations. 
Contrast this with my claim that background facts power inductive inference. 
 Finally these last quotes indicate that the locality of (c) is contradicted in so far as 
these procedures lead to exceptionless, universal statements or generalizations. 
 It will be helpful to note that McCaskey and I use the term “material” as in 
“material theory of induction” differently. My use is narrow, as indicated by (a), (b) and 
(c) above. McCaskey’s use is broader. That the conceptual tradition does not employ 
formal schemas may well be all that is needed for him to classify it as “material.” 
 Finally I share McCaskey’s concern that we are losing sight of the importance of 
locating projectable properties. It is, as he notes, central to my example in Chapter 1 of 
Curie’s inference on radium chloride. However I do understand why the approach has 
been marginalized. Modern problems in inductive inference are not resolved merely by 
the identification of projectable properties. Much more is needed to establish how the 
observed motions of the planets inductively support the curved spacetime of Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity; and how the observed lines of the hydrogen spectrum 
inductively support the Schroedinger equation of quantum mechanics. 
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Matthew Parker, “Comparative infinite lottery logic” 
 Matthew Parker’s paper develops an alternative inductive logic to the one 
described in Chapter 13, “Infinite Lottery Machines” of The Material Theory of 
Induction. The chapter assigns a monadic chance function “Ch(.),” to the outcomes of fair 
infinite lottery drawings. In its place, Parker proposes a dyadic, comparative relation 
among outcomes, ≼,	 to be read as “is at most as likely as.” Parker’s contribution is most 
welcome. My goal in developing the infinite lottery logic was not merely to provide a 
means of assessing the strength of inductive support for various infinite lottery outcomes. 
Rather it was to demonstrate by example that interesting, non-probabilistic calculi of 
inductive inference are appropriate when the circumstances call for it. Parker’s program 
serves this end well. He is exploring which non-probabilistic logics are required by the 
facts of the infinite lottery. 
 His analysis draws on the existing literature in comparative probability. There has 
been a significant lost opportunity in that literature. Its purpose is almost never to reveal 
new, unexplored avenues. Rather the goal is to find that combination of properties that 
returns the probability calculus. It is an engaging exercise in formal mathematics, but one 
with a predetermined result. It is mathematically intriguing, but foundationally barren. In 
seeking novel alternatives, Parker’s analysis exploits the untapped potential of this 
literature.3 
 Parker asks precisely the right question: “… what background facts about a fair 
infinite lottery warrant the assumption that the correct logic involves a chance function?” 
(Introduction). That warranting is the basis of the material theory. My analysis put most 
effort into justifying label independence, since that property led directly to the 
characteristic features of the logic. Parker is now pressing me to justify why these 
background facts lead to what he calls an “absolute” chance, that is a chance value 
assigned directly to an outcome. His alternative is that the chance relation is purely 
comparative. 
 
3 For other profitable uses of this comparative notion, see Eva (2019) and Norton (2007). 
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 The reasoning in support of this absolute chance is limited to judgments of 
equality of chance. By supposition, the defining characteristic of a fair lottery is that all 
that matters to the drawing of a number in some outcome set is the size (cardinality) of 
the set of favorable numbers in comparison with that of unfavorable numbers. If any 
further specification affects the drawing, then the lottery is not fair. For then some 
numbers are favored over others. It follows immediately that two outcomes have the 
same chance just if the cardinalities of their favorable sets match and the cardinalities of 
their unfavorable sets match.  
 The procedure is the same as we might use for determining equalities of chances 
for a fair die throw. We know that an even outcome {2, 4, 6} has the same chance as an 
odd outcome {1, 3, 5} since the cardinalities match. Or that an outcome {1, 2} has the 
same chance as {5, 6} since they too have matching cardinalities. Were the even outcome 
to have a different chance from an odd outcome, the die would not be fair. 
  Nothing more is introduced by the chance function “Ch(.).” To see this, consider 
all outcomes that arise only if one of three favorable numbers are drawn. All outcomes 
with just three favorable numbers have the same chance. A compact way to express this 
sameness is to assign these outcomes a value V3 and declare it the value of the chance 
function Ch(.) assigned to them. This monadic chance function does nothing more than 
report the sameness of chance of these outcomes due to their matching cardinalities. 
There is no further assumption over what the value set may be. 
 This condition of equality is enough to give us the characteristic property of the 
infinite lottery logic. The chances of an even outcome (“even”), an odd outcome (“odd”), 
a prime number outcome, a composite number outcome and a power of ten are all equal. 
That is true no matter what other chance properties the lottery may have. Included in 
these equalities is the one Parker finds troublesome: A multiple of four outcome {4, 8, 
12, 16, …}, here called “fours,” has the same chance as an even outcome {2, 4, 6, …}, 
even though fours is a proper subset of even. This last equality is not posited 
independently, but it is deduced from the cardinality condition for the equality of 
chances. 
 Parker’s comparative relation has the property of denying this last equality. 
According to it, the outcome fours is strictly less likely than even. This alternative will, 
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no doubt, be appealing to some. For, as Parker notes (Introduction), “whenever the latter 
set [fours] wins, the former [even] does too, but not vice versa.” The appeal derives from 
the obvious judgment that even divides into two equal sized parts: fours and even 
numbers not divisible by four. Thus fours is smaller than even and so should be accorded 
a lesser chance. 
 The naturalness of this alternative reflects a characteristic property of finite sets 
not shared by infinite sets. There are two criteria of comparing the sizes of sets. Under the 
inclusion criterion used just now, a set is larger than any of its proper subsets. Under the 
cardinality criterion, a set is the same size as all those to which it can be mapped one-to-
one. These two criteria agree when applied to finite sets. They no longer agree when 
applied to infinite sets. Even is strictly larger than fours under the inclusion criterion, but 
equal in size to fours under the cardinality criterion. This divergence is at the core of 
what makes the initial experience of theorizing with infinite sets disorienting. 
 Label independence requires judgments of equality of chances to conform with 
the cardinality criterion. Outcome sets of equal cardinal size, according to it, have the 
same chance. The results contradict the inclusion criterion and lead to the widespread 
violations of the condition of containment. 
 In devising a comparative relation that respects containment, Parker is trying to 
conform with both criteria. The resulting comparative relation has many appealing 
properties. It satisfies a comparative version of additivity, not supported by my chance 
function, Ch(.). It also respects containment, when my chance function does not. Fours is 
strictly less likely than even.4 However, it is hard to serve two masters when they 
disagree. Efforts to do so pay a price. Parker’s comparative relation secures these 
properties at the cost of disallowing likelihood comparisons of many outcomes sets. 
According to it, outcomes of even numbers and odd numbers less than 2N are equally 
 
4 We have fours	≼ even, but not even	≼ fours, since |fours\even| = |{}| = 0, which is less 
than |even\fours| = |{evens not divisible by 4}| = infinity. However, we cannot compare 
fours with odd, since fours\odd = fours and odd\fours = odd, both of which are infinite 
sets. Similarly, we cannot compare even and odd since even\odd = even and odd\even = 
odd, both of which are infinite sets. 
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likely, for all natural numbers N. However, the extension to infinite sets fails. We cannot 
compare the likelihood of even and odd outcomes without the restriction to finite subsets, 
no matter how natural the equality of their chances may seem. Similarly, while a fours 
outcome is strictly less likely than an even outcome, we cannot compare the likelihood of 
a fours outcome with an odd outcome, even though we might otherwise expect even and 
odd outcomes to be equally likely. 
 That Parker’s relation does not compare these likelihoods is no mere oversight, 
but essential to the cogency of the relation. No such relation can have both: 
(a) fours is strictly less likely than even; and  
(b) even is as likely as odd. 
while retaining label independence and transitivity.5 
 Nonetheless, it is hard to resist the appeal of a comparative relation that tells us 
that fours is strictly less likely than even. It would seem to be guiding us better in our 
lottery ticket purchases. This appearance, I contend, derives from intuitions tutored on 
finite lotteries. There sets larger under the inclusion criterion do have greater probability. 
These intuitions are a poor guide for infinite lotteries, where I do not see a formal 
foundation for them.  
 The greater probability of even over fours in the finite lottery can be expressed in 
terms of frequencies. Over repeated drawings, the frequencies of even drawings will 
converge towards a half and the frequencies of fours drawings will converge towards a 
quarter. That convergence is not assured. Rather it is a theorem in the probability calculus 
that the convergence is very probable. 
 There is no corresponding result for the infinite lottery. Whenever a fours wins, so 
does an even, but not conversely. The temptation is to shift from this result to another 
about frequencies: in the long run, an even number wins twice as often as a fours; or 
 
5 A relabeling of outcomes renumbers fours and even as odd and not-fours respectively, 
so that, by (a), odd is strictly less likely than not-fours. Transitivity with (a) and (b) gives 
us that fours is strictly less likely than not-fours. But a different relabeling of fours and 
not-fours renumbers them as even and odd, respectively, so that by (b) they are equally 
likely. 
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perhaps just strictly more often. As in the probabilistic case, any such convergence is not 
assured. It must be given to us by the chances. The chapter in the The Material Theory of 
Induction demonstrates that the chances do not provide it. That is, the chance of having n 
fours drawings among N drawings, for each n, is the same as having n even drawings 
among N drawings, no matter how large N.6 The chances give us no basis for expecting a 
higher frequency of even outcomes over fours outcomes in repeated drawings. 
 If this result is puzzling, recall that the cardinality condition operates differently 
for infinite and finite sets. In the finite lottery, there are twice as many numbers in the 
outcome even as in fours. In the infinite lottery, there are exactly as many numbers in the 
outcome even as in fours. 
 In these last remarks, I have stressed where Parker and I have differences since 
they might mark a way forward. In closing, I want to stress that these differences are tiny 
in comparison with our overall agreement on how to proceed with the chance properties 
of an infinite lottery. We are not to presume antecedently that chance properties must be 
probabilistic. Rather the chance properties are determined by the facts of the system in 
question. If further analysis demonstrates that these facts unequivocally determine a 
comparative relation such as Parker advocates, I will happily accept the result. For it 
would be yet another demonstration of the material theory of induction in action. The 
facts of a domain determine the applicable inductive logic, not our formal habits or 
presumptions. 
 
Julian Reiss, “What are the drivers of induction? Towards a material 
theory” 
 It is comforting to find that Julian Reiss and I are in agreement on major issues 
concerning inductive inference. Notably he agrees with the rejection of formal theories of 
induction, presumably when they have aspirations of universal applicability; and allows 
that material facts do have a role in warranting inductive inferences. He urges, however, 
 
6 Here I thank Matt Parker for assistance in the derivations of these results and for 
alerting me to an error in an earlier draft of them. 
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that the material theory of induction omits important drivers of induction, as he calls 
them, in restricting its warrants to facts. He lists six drivers that, he believes, have been 
omitted. Here I will give my reasons for disagreeing. 
 There is a quite general reason for doubting that there are drivers of induction 
independent of material facts. If one accepts that there are no universally applicable 
systems of inductive inference, it follows that no driver can be employed everywhere. 
Whether a driver can be employed in some domain is determined by the facts of that 
domain. That is, we trace the warrant for some inference past the driver to the facts that 
authorize the driver. 
 Reiss’ six candidate drivers, however, require more individualized analysis. First 
are theories. The material theory allows theories to warrant inductive inferences, in so far 
as they are true theories. It does not align with the narrow Baconian notion of inductive 
inference, as Reiss suggests (Section 4.1). There are many examples of theories 
warranting inductive inferences in my work. Chapter 16, “A Quantum Inductive Logic,” 
of The Material Theory of Induction employs the theory of quantum mechanics to 
warrant a particular calculus of inductive inference. 
 My understanding, however, is that Reiss’ concern is not merely with theory, but 
with theories or even just postulates that have a hypothetical character. He finds an 
equivocation in my writing over whether facts warrant or hypotheses do. There is no 
equivocation here. There is one account addressing two distinct questions. What warrants 
an inductive inference? Answer: facts, whether the inferring agent knows the fact or not. 
How can an agent know that some inductive inference is good? Answer: by learning the 
truth of the warranting fact. Since scientists often seek to infer while knowing too little, 
they hypothesize what would be the warrant for their inference if the hypothesis were to 
be true. Establishing its truth is necessary, but a job for future work. They thereby take on 
an evidential debt that must be discharged by further inductive work if they are to be sure 
of the security of the first inductive inference.7 
 
7 This role of hypotheses has been developed in Norton (2014). It is not developed in The 
Material Theory of Induction, since that project is reserved for work presently underway. 
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 My writing runs the two questions together. The warranting material facts were 
initially called “postulates” in Norton (2003) since, when we know too little, we may 
need to conjecture which are the applicable warranting facts. I had expected readers 
would be able to disentangle the two questions without trouble. Here I erred and my 
exposition has failed. Partick Skeels (this volume) also has had trouble distinguishing the 
two questions in my texts. 
  The next omitted drivers are idealizations and, related to them, “adequacy-for-
purpose.” I do allow idealizations to serve the role of a warrant. Reiss recalls one: the 
cosmological principle, which, construed narrowly, asserts the falsehood that the universe 
is exactly homogeneous and isotropic. Idealizations such as these are quite admissible as 
warrants, in so far as the falsities in them do no compromise the inductive inference to be 
warranted. 
 For example, the cosmological principle can be employed in inferences from the 
present 3K of the cosmic background radiation to the temperatures of earlier epochs. For 
this inference is unaffected by the slight deviations from isotropy and homogeneity in the 
cosmic microwave background. If, however, the inference is to star and galaxy formation, 
then matters are otherwise. The slight deviations from isotropy of the order of 10-5K in 
the cosmic microwave background reflect the inhomogenities in matter distribution that 
seeded star and galaxy formation through gravitational collapse. 
 In this context, Reiss finds our purposes to be a driver of inductive inferences. If 
they are to be part of the warrant for the inductive inference, then this is not so. Our 
purposes will tell us which inferences interest us. Whether the idealization, such as the 
cosmological principle, is close enough to the truth for it to serve as a warrant for the 
inference of interest is independent of whether our purposes make that inference 
interesting. 
 Reiss next follows a well-established literature in urging that ethical values have a 
role in inductive inference. His discussion recalls a familiar debate. I have nothing to add 
to my treatment and dissent elaborated in Chapter 5 of The Material Theory of Induction. 
Consider the proposition that there will be a planet destroying chain reaction on the 
explosion of the first atomic bomb near Alomogordo, New Mexico. The formulation of 
the proposition certainly reflects our human interests. However, once it is formulated, the 
 31 
strength of support provided by the evidence available to the Manhattan project scientists 
is independent of those human concerns. The physics of neutrons and nuclei is indifferent 
to the gravity of our alarm. However, that alarm will figure in how the resulting strength 
of support affects our actions. 
 Methodological norms are, for Reiss, also an additional driver of inductive 
inferences. His example is the choice between classical and Bayesian statistical methods. 
Here the material theory is unequivocal. Neither method can claim default status. They 
have a positive obligation in each case to justify their applicability. That justification 
derives from the facts of the relevant domain. This assessment has been developed at 
great length for Bayesian methods in roughly half the chapters of The Material Theory of 
Induction. A similar assessment would apply to classical methods. Reiss, however, 
asserts that facts cannot separate the methodologies in the case of the stopping rule 
problem, since both agree on the facts of the case. Here I differ. The facts of the case 
under agreement would not include those that justify the use of Bayesian or the classical 
statistical framework in the first place. Indeed it may even be that such facts are lacking 
so that one or both methodologies is unwarranted. 
 Finally, Reiss’ sixth driver is “conceptual norms.” The material theory asserts that 
concepts can only be used properly in an inductive inference in so far as the background 
facts warrant it. Take Reiss’ example of the inductive inference to causes. Elsewhere 
(Norton, 2003a), I have argued that there is no antecedent notion of cause prior to all 
science. Causal talk is merely the attaching of convenient labels to processes in science, 
without factually restricting them. As a result, our conceptions of cause undergo 
continual change as they respond to factual discoveries in science. It follows that 
inferences to causes do not go beyond the facts of the pertinent domain. In another 
example, we are told that evidence favors the simpler hypothesis. There is, however, no 
factual, universal principle of simplicity. Rather, as I have argued in Chapters 6 and 7 of 
The Material Theory of Induction, good appeals to simplicity are really indirect appeals 
to particular background facts in the pertinent domain. 
 No doubt, the material theory of induction can be improved. Doing so by adding 
non-material drivers may have some initial appeal. However, since they are non-material, 
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these additional drivers do not strengthen the theory, but dilute it and, I suspect, may even 
destabilize it. 
 
Gerhard Schurz and Paul Thorn, “The material theory of object-induction 
and the universal optimality of meta-induction: two complementary 
accounts” 
 Gerhard Schurz and Paul Thorn are experts in the learning theoretic approach to 
induction. Elsewhere, they have provided rich and deep studies of the application of the 
approach. Their formal approach differs in both spirit and content from that of the 
material theory of induction. Hence it is encouraging to be assured by them that the two 
approaches agree in large measure and relate in a complementary fashion. 
 A substantial portion of their paper consists of a recapitulation of what they call 
the “optimality justification” of induction that responds to Hume’s venerable problem of 
induction. Briefly, their goal is not to prove that some inductive method is reliable, for 
they accept that induction may fail. Rather, following Reichenbach, they merely seek to 
show that it is the best that we can do. The basis of this claim is a set of mathematical 
theorems on infinite sequences of possibly rounded real numbers in [0,1] and a set of 
functions that map initial segments to real numbers in [0,1]. The maps are “methods” or 
“players.” They represent scientists employing inductive inference in their exploration of 
the world. One of them is the optimal “meta-inductivist.” These collections are called 
“prediction games” or “possible worlds.” This austere mathematical structure is intended 
to capture all that matters of the inductive practices of real science as far as establishing 
the basic theorems of the optimality justification is concerned. 
 Since they are the experts and have already provided a synopsis of this work in 
their text, there is no need for me to say more. Their synopsis should be taken as an 
invitation to explore their more detailed accounts and I hope that this invitation will be 
accepted by readers sympathetic to this style of formal analysis. 
 The earlier part of their paper, however, lays out in some detail where Schurz and 
Thorn find the material theory of induction to fail. They argue that the material theory is 
unable to answer Hume’s problem. Their optimality justification presupposes that there is 
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no answer to the problem better than it. Here I will explain why I disagree with their 
complaint. 
 To make their case, Schurz and Thorn seek to attribute to me what they call the 
“uniformity justification of induction.” Warranting facts must in turn be warranted by 
further facts; and those by further facts; and so on. As we proceed along this sequence, 
they assert (Section 2, their emphasis), “the uniformity assumptions that justify material 
inductive inferences become unavoidably more and more general.” They provide an 
example based on my original paper of 2003. In it, they display a sequence of 
increasingly general warranting propositions, numbered by them (4), (5), (6) and (7). 
They terminate in a tight circularity. Such is the fate, they suggest, of all justificatory 
efforts in a material theory. (To preclude confusion, readers should be alerted that 
propositions (5), (6) and (7) are not drawn from my work but are conjectures over how a 
material theorist would proceed. I do not endorse them.) 
 This material theorist sees the problem quite differently. In order to produce the 
troublesome regress, Schurz and Thorn make an assumption about the large-scale 
structure of relations of inductive support. They attribute a hierarchical structure to it in 
which propositions of one generality require warrants in propositions of greater 
generality. An examination of actual relations of support in science fails to shows this 
hierarchical structure. Instead we find a massive tangle of relations of support admitting 
no such hierarchy. No regress of the type envisaged by Schurz and Thorn is found there. 
 Schurz and Thorn seek the justification for induction within the material theory at 
the end of regress they construct; and of course they do not find it. In the material theory 
of induction, there is no single locus, like the end of a rainbow, where the justification of 
inductive inference as a whole is found. The justification is distributed over the entirety 
of the relations of inductive support. Pick any proposition central to a mature science. 
The justification for it can be displayed. There is no such proposition for which a 
justification cannot be given. One can, if one wants, try to trace out the relations of 
support. Because of the non-hierarchical and tangled nature of the relations of support, 
one rapidly takes a tour through and round an enormous maze, whose paths divide and 
divide again, and perhaps some even lead back to the starting point. None end poorly. 
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 This material analysis provides all the justification needed and in a way that is 
recognizable in actual science. There is no basis for doubt of the periodic table of the 
elements or any other of the myriad of propositions in a mature science simply because 
each is well-supported. That support resides in the relations among the various 
propositions and does not require any of the general formal schemas whose adoption 
leads immediately to a fanciful regress or the dubious, tight circularities of the traditional 
Hume problem. To accept that fact, but still to harbor doubts is to ask for justification 
while ignoring its presence. It is akin to a novice engineer who examines the individual 
beams and struts of some fanciful architectural structure and find each to be well-
supported. Nonetheless the engineer somehow still doubts that the structure can stand. 
 This analysis has been developed in greater detail in Norton (2014), which 
unfortunately does not appear in Schurz and Thorn’s list of references. That it can be 
overlooked is understandable. I avoided all talk of it in the chapters of The Material 
Theory of Induction until that avoidance was finally explained briefly in the work’s 
epilog, where I foreshow further elaborations now in preparation. 
 
Patrick Skeels, “A tale of two Nortons” 
 Patrick Skeels’ “A Tale of Two Nortons” will be alarming to those who find one 
Norton to be already one too many. The first Norton encountered by Skeels argues that 
inductive inferences are justified by facts. The second Norton argues that inductive 
inferences are justified by knowledge of those facts. It is, we are told (Section 1.3.2), 
“less than clear what position Norton is, in fact, defending”; and (Introduction) “one may 
worry that Norton is vacillating between two substantially different views.” 
 Fortunately there is only one Norton writing on the material theory of induction 
and only one theory. There are however two questions.  Skeels has mistaken the 
treatment of two questions by one theory as the implementation of two theories. The two 
questions are: 
(inductive-logical) 
Question: Which inductive inferences are good? 
Answer: Those that are warranted by a (true) fact. 
(epistemic) 
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Question: How can we know that a specific inductive inference is good? 
Answer: We must be assured of the truth of the appropriate warranting 
fact. 
The first question pertains to logical relations among propositions. The warranting facts 
do their work independently of human knowledge and awareness. Nothing precludes 
awareness of them. It is just that their warranting powers are independent of such 
awareness. The second pertains to the processes of gaining this knowledge. The answers 
to both questions are closely coupled. The warranting fact of the answer to the second 
question is the fact that warrants in the answer to the first question. The two Nortons of 
Skeels’ critique are really just one Norton answering these two questions with one theory. 
 In answering them, I did not make any real effort to distinguish the questions 
sharply. I thought the context quite sufficient to discriminate them. It was of some 
concern to me on reading Skeels remarks that at least one reader was confused. I reread 
the two papers on which Skeels concentrated, Norton (2003, 2014), and I was reassured 
that a sympathetic reader would have little trouble recognizing the distinctness of the 
questions and the unity of the answers.  
  Skeels has quoted passages symptomatic of the two Nortons. The “fact” version 
of Norton is quoted (Section 1.1) as saying  
[Facts] justify the induction, whether the inducing scientist is aware of them 
or not, just as the scientist may effect a valid deduction without explicitly 
knowing that it implements the disjunctive syllogism 
This passage answers the “inductive-logical” question. It makes a point in inductive 
logic, distinct from any matters of human knowledge and awareness. The “knowledge” 
version of Norton is quoted by Skeels (Section 1.3.1) as saying:  
In order to learn a fact by induction, the material theory says that we must 
already know a fact, [the material postulate that licenses the induction]. 
This second remark clearly addresses the discovery activities of inferring agents who 
seek to learn. It answers the epistemic question. It does so by drawing on the answer to 
the inductive-logical question. This may be less clear to readers of Skeels since his quote 
omits the words “the material postulate that licenses the induction” in the original 
passage, included here in brackets. 
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 There are many more pertinent remarks, supposedly by the two Nortons.8 I am 
confident that, with this clarification, readers will have little trouble seeing that they are 
remarks by one Norton with one theory on two problems. 
 While it is tedious to dispute minor points, one such remark requires a correction. 
Skeels remarks in his introduction that “Norton’s material theory was developed for the 
explicit purpose of dissolving Hume’s Problem…” As a simple matter of biography, this 
is not so. The ideas of the original 2003 paper were fully worked out before Jim Bogen9 
pointed out that there was a connection to the problem of induction. The problem 
occupies only 3 pages of the paper. My monograph, The Material Theory of Induction, 
contains 16 chapters, none of which mention the problem of induction. It is mentioned 
only in an Epilog, when I explain why it was not mentioned earlier. The reason is that the 
problem provides a distraction so irresistible to many philosophers that they then fail to 
see that the real goal of the material theory of induction is to show the material nature of 
inductive inference. That the theory dissolves the problem of induction was an 
unexpected bonus and a welcome one at that. 
 The reason this minor misunderstanding requires correction is that it forms the 
basis of Skeels’ critique of the material theory of induction. His stated purpose (Section 
3) is to show that “both [Nortons] failed to accomplish their intended purpose of 
dissolving Hume’s Problem.” And, as a result, “If my arguments are successful, then the 
material theory faces a significant difficulty…. It is unclear whether or not the material 
theory is beyond repair…” I do not believe that the material theory of induction is in need 
of any repair.  A failure to dissolve the problem of induction does not impinge on the 
theory’s goal. It would merely put it in the company of very many other such failures. 
 
8 I found only one exception in the two papers, Norton (2003, 2014), in which I simply 
misspoke (“miswrote”). Norton (2003, p. 658) says “We can see immediately that the 
material postulate that underwrites our inference in accepting these result is just our 
belief that the method is reliable.” I collapsed two points into one. I meant, first, that the 
inference is warranted by the fact of the reliability of method; and, second, that our 
acceptance of the inference derives from our belief in this fact. 
9 He is acknowledged for the point in Norton (2003, p. 667, footnote 8). 
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 That said, it does not seem to me that Skeels’ critique impugns the dissolution. I 
stand by my account and invite readers to read it and make up their own minds. It will be 
useful, however, if I indicate here why I am unmoved by Skeels’ critique.  
 While his reasons likely differ from mine, Skeels accepts (Section 2.1.1) that the 
problem of induction is dissolved in the context of the inductive-logical question above:  
It must be admitted that the fact version of the material theory does appear 
to solve Hume’s Problem. Indeed, it neutralizes it altogether. 
However, he continues to argue that a “formal theorist” can proceed by “claiming that 
facts can justify formal inductive inferences in precisely the same way.” From this he 
concludes that the material theory is “completely immaterial” to the dissolution and the 
view is “somewhat self-defeating.” 
 This is a gratifying concession since it grants that the material theory has actually 
dissolved the problem of induction in the inductive-logical sense. I also welcome formal 
theorists who decide to justify their schemas with material facts. In so doing, they have 
become material theorists. That is not a defeat, but victory for the material theory. 
 I have argued that the relations of inductive support in mature sciences form a 
massively tangled structure that is self-supporting. While circularities are inevitable and 
rampant in this structure, I believe the circularity is benign. In this aspect, my account is 
similar to coherentist epistemology, although I am not a coherentist epistemologist. 
Skeels is willing to grant that the circularity in coherentist epistemology is benign. 
However he refuses to grant it to the material theory of induction. His reason (Section 
2.2) is that beliefs can enter into benign circularities, he says, “precisely because they 
have content, e.g. propositions can entail other propositions but they cannot entail a rule 
or an action.” He couples this with the claim that material theory concerns rules for 
inductive inference. Hence “coherence simply is not applicable when they [rules] are 
present.” 
 What Skeels overlooks with this objection is that propositions can also be 
equivalent to rules in the sense that their meaning authorizes inferences. In deductive 
logic, “If A then B” is both a proposition and authorizes a rule that allows one to infer 
from A to B. In inductive logic, the proposition “samples of elements are generally 
uniform in their properties” is both a fact and also authorizes inductive inferences among 
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the properties of samples of elements. Once this dual function is recognized,  Skeels’ 
objection fails. 
 Finally, “Norton’s Decision” is that agents are supposed to be in a quandary over 
whether to make an inductive inference, since justification is blocked by Hume-problem-
like circularities. It is presented as a new and unanswered question. That is quite puzzling 
since the challenge is just the “epistemic” question above, when set within the context of 
my treatment of the problem of induction. The answer I have given is that agents can 
know that an inductive inference is justified by tracing out its warrant in the complicated, 
non-hierarchical tangle of relations of inductive support described in my papers. 
  Skeels overlooks this answer. The reason seems to reside in his remark: 
… we lack direct, unmediated, epistemic access to the facts. Once we 
separate justification from decision in the way that the fact version of the 
material theory does, this question becomes especially pertinent as it cannot 
be solved in the same way as Hume’s Problem. 
The difficulty here is obvious. It is only Skeels’ misreading of the material theory that 
precludes an agent having access to these facts. 
 It seems that this misreading arose through Skeels identification of the “fact” 
Norton as an external epistemologist. It is against this externalist “fact” Norton that the 
decision problem is directed.10 In an externalist epistemology, agents need not and may 
not have access to the justifications of their inferences. Thus the “fact” Norton can 
suppose that agents have no access to the facts that warrant their inductive inferences. 
This preclusion is simply an artifact of Skeels’ imposition of an externalist epistemology 
onto this part of the material theory. There is nothing in the theory that precludes an agent 
identifying the warranting facts of an inductive inference if the agent seeks it. I often 
write of agents doing just this. 
 Indeed, I am left wondering if the creation of the two Nortons is a result of 
misguided efforts to divide the claims of the material theory into mutually incompatible 
externalist and internalist sets. Those efforts create the externalist “fact” Norton and the 
 
10 “Unlike externalists, internalists do not have to face Norton’s Decision…” (Section 
2.1.2.) 
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internalist “knowledge” Norton. Since externalist and internalist epistemologies, so 
construed, are incompatible, these invented Nortons must harbor incompatible 
commitments. The resulting misreading of the material theory would then be a lesson in 
the dangers of imposing ill-matched categories onto a theory. 
 
Michael Stuart, “The material theory of induction and the epistemology of 
thought experiments” 
 Michael Stuart’s contribution to this volume gives us more than a critical response 
to the material theory of induction. It is also a proposal for an extended epistemology of 
thought experiments that can accommodate the material conception of inductive 
inference. It offers new and interesting insights into thought experiments and is well 
worth careful study. 
 The motivation Stuart provides for his account is a tension in my work in two 
areas. In my analysis of the epistemology of thought experiments, I argue that thought 
experiments are simply picturesque arguments. This analysis was completed in its major 
conceptions before I worked on the material theory of induction. In the thought 
experiment analysis, I proceeded with a formal characterization of inference, both 
deductive and inductive. The material theory now disputes this characterization of 
inductive inference. Stuart is correct to identify the tension and urge the need for a 
reconciliation. It is this aspect of his paper that I will discuss here. 
 Stuart is greatly troubled by the tension and finds it to require some major 
concessions from my original argument account of thought experiments. Those 
concessions conveniently open a space for the embellishments of his own account. My 
assessment, however, is that substituting a material conception of inductive inference 
requires rather little to change in the argument account. Indeed, in some areas, it is 
strengthened. Stuart has described seven theses in the argument account. They are 
 
Identity Thesis, Reconstruction Thesis, Reliability Thesis, Elimination 
Thesis, Empirical Psychology Thesis, Empiricist Thesis. 
 
All seven are retained, in my view, after the material reconception of inductive inference.  
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 In so far as the argumentation in a thought experiment is deductive, then no 
modification is needed. These deductive thought experiments constitute a significant 
portion of the whole corpus of thought experiments in science and contain many of the 
most prominent examples from all eras. They include Stevin’s sixteenth century looped 
chain thought experiment; Maxwell’s original nineteenth century demon thought 
experiment; and Einstein’s thought experiments that establish the relativity of 
simultaneity and E=mc2. 
 Changes are needed only when the argument in the thought experiment is 
inductive. Then there is one casualty. In Norton (2004, pp. 52-53) I argue that the 
reliability of a thought experiment depends on our being able to identify a “mark” within 
it that is then identified as some formal feature associated with a general notion of a 
logic. To accommodate material inductive inference, this argument must be generalized 
to include marks derived from warranting background facts. I expect this can be done, 
since background facts can warrant mini-logics applicable just to their specific domains. 
Will the resulting modified argument be successful? Answering awaits someone willing 
to undertake a full working out of the needed modification. 
 Otherwise, the claims and arguments of the account stand. I revisit a few of them 
here. The principal thesis (“Identity Thesis”) is that thought experiments are just 
picturesque arguments. My main argument for this derives from the premise that “pure 
thought cannot conjure up new knowledge” (Norton, 2004, p. 50). All that the armchair 
reflections of thought experiments can do properly is to transform what we already know 
in a way that preserves its truth (deductive inference) or preserves its likelihood 
(inductive inference) (p. 49). 
 A second and lesser11 argument (p. 50) is that there are no examples known to me 
of well-functioning thought experiments in science that cannot be reconstructed as 
arguments. Stuart is correct to identify this inference from cases to the general claim as 
an inductive inference and he is correct to ask me for the background facts that warrant it. 
Stuart (Section 4) conjectures without success what these background facts might assert 
 
11 Unfortunately, Stuart (Section 4) misidentifies this second argument in two forms B) 
and C) as the “main pieces of evidence for the argument view.” 
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of thought experiments. He is searching in the wrong place. The inductive inference is at 
the metalevel of the thought experiment literature and that is where these background 
facts are found. They are that the total corpus of scientific thought experiments is small 
and well-explored by philosophers. Over the last 30 years, the argument account has been 
a prominent target of criticism. Yet, in spite of the extended efforts of critics to find 
counterexamples, none has emerged. Indeed, if thought experiments could open a novel 
epistemic channel that transcends the reach of argumentation, there would be a powerful 
incentive for scientists to employ it. Yet no such thought experiment has been located by 
the philosophical literature. 
 The cases made for other theses in the argument account remain. An example is 
the Empirical Psychological Thesis, which Stuart wants to discard. The thesis asserts that 
the actual conduct of a thought experiment is the execution in thought of the 
reconstructed argument. This follows from a straightforward reading of common thought 
experiment texts: the narrative simply walks the reader through the steps of an argument. 
It also follows from the fact that the execution of a thought experiments gives us nothing 
more than the conclusions of the reconstructed argument. If some mode other than 
argumentation is at work, that mode has the curious property of mimicking 
argumentation perfectly in what it can tell us. This justification remains when we replace 
a formal conception of inductive inference by a material conception. 
 Finally, the argument given in Norton (2004, pp. 52-53) for the reliability thesis 
requires modification. However, the reliability thesis persists as a challenge to any 
candidate account of thought experiments. As Norton (2004, §2.2) shows, there are many 
cases of thought experiments whose results are contradicted by a second thought 
experiment. What independent provision does the candidate account provide to enable us 
to separate the good thought experiments from those that mislead? If thought 
experimenting is to be a reliable instrument, there must be some way of doing this. No 
other account of thought experiments in the survey of Norton (2004) can do this except 
through the use of some argument structure. The argument account effects the separation 
by assessing the cogency of the argumentation.  
 Replacing a formal notion of inductive inference with a material notion 
strengthens the argument account since the material approach gives much better control 
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of inductive inference. To use Stuart’s example, Newton and a composite Mach-Einstein 
arrive at competing conclusions in the Newton’s bucket thought experiment. Each is 
inferred as a best explanation. If we approach inference to the best explanation formally, 
our adjudication will require some general assessment of who truly explains better. The 
competing and convoluted accounts of explanation in the present literature can provide 
no clear decision at this general level. However, the material analysis of inference to the 
best explanation in Chapters 8 and 9 of The Material Theory of Induction will guide us 
quite quickly to the differences of background facts presumed that lead to their different 
conclusions. 
 A second example concerns the use of typicality as a form of inductive 
generalization in thought experiments. Assessing the strength of such typicality 
inferences by general, formal means leads to intractable vagueness. A material analysis 
treats each such inference as, in principle, distinct and in need of its own warranting facts. 
Identifying them, or their absence, enables appraisal of the cogency of the argument.12 
 My account of thought experiments seeks only to solve what I call the 
“epistemological problem of thought experiments in science” (Norton, 2004, p. 44): 
Thought experiments are supposed to give us knowledge of the natural 
world. From where does this knowledge come? 
Stuart’s “pluralist epistemology” goes beyond this problem and considers, among other 
things, how we might create13 a thought experiment, its broader aims, the epistemic 
virtues of reasoning agents and at least mentions their rhetorical prowess. These bring 
welcome and fruitful expansions of the original epistemological problem, but they require 
no further corrections to my original argument account of thought experiments.  
 
12 For an example of typicality inferences in a thought experiment that has caused long-
standing mischief, see my account (Norton, 2018) of the “The Worst Thought 
Experiment.” 
13 To preclude confusion, Stuart (Section 7.1) associates this discovery of the thought 
experiment with the “context of discovery.” I also use the term (Norton, 2004, p. 50) to 
refer to activity of carrying out the argument in an existing thought experiment to 
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